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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Cold War, fundamental changes in global governance, 
power dynamics, and economic relations have led to a period of vigorous 
structural and substantive growth in the arena of international law. Structurally, 
this period has been marked by a proliferation of international courts and 
tribunals. Substantively, we have seen the elucidation and development of many 
areas of international law. These developments have increased the complexity of 
international law and led to new challenges in various areas, including 
international dispute resolution. 
This Article addresses three of the hottest topics in international dispute 
resolution. Part II focuses on reconciling international criminal justice with 
domestic peace by exploring three case studies in Latin America, Africa, and 
Europe, respectively. Part III discusses the perils of the fragmentation of 
international law by examining how disparate courts interpret and apply the same 
legal principles and instruments in competing ways. Part IV examines the 
growing interface between the jurisprudence of domestic courts and international 
courts and tribunals. Each of these issues can be attributed, in part, to this 
structural and substantive growth in the sphere of international law. 
II. HOT TOPIC 1: RECONCILING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND 
DOMESTIC PEACE 
Countries undergoing transition, whether from repressive rule or recovering 
from war, are often confronted with the need to address legacies fraught with 
grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. It is only by 
dealing with the past through addressing the root causes of violence in its various 
forms and specifically addressing grievances that societies can reconcile 
differences, move forward, and build a sustainable peace. Indeed, international 
law requires states to investigate and prosecute gross violations of human rights 
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and serious violations of international humanitarian law, to provide redress to 
victims of those violations, and to take measures to prevent further violations.1 
There is no “one size fits all” method, however, for coming to terms with a 
violent past. Rather, the most appropriate way forward for a particular society 
will depend on a variety of context-specific, socio-political, economic, and 
cultural factors. Toward this end, over the years, states have employed a variety 
of measures, including the establishment of truth commissions; the enactment of 
amnesty or lustration laws; the provision of reparations to victims; domestic 
prosecutions of alleged perpetrators; traditional forms of justice, such as the 
Gacaca courts established in response to the Rwandan genocide;2 or any 
combination thereof. Furthermore, in the early 1990s, another transitional justice 
tool emerged from the toolbox, after having lain dormant for nearly half a 
century.  
With the establishment of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and Rwanda (“ICTR”), the hybrid criminal 
tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, and the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of 
Cambodia (“ECCC”), and finally, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), the 
legacy of the post-World War II military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo has 
been revived.3 Criminal justice in the international arena has become a leading 
means of seeking accountability for gross violations of human rights and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. For the past nineteen years, these 
institutions have proven to be effective means of combating impunity, and, 
furthermore, have made significant contributions to the elucidation and 
development of international criminal and humanitarian law. Correspondingly, 
the prosecution of internationally-condemned crimes in domestic jurisdictions 
has gained increasing momentum. 
 
1. See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21 2006); see also Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for 
Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Reparations Programmes, at 5-6, U.N. Doc. 
HR/PUB/08/1 (2008) (listing, inter alia, article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 2 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and article 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment as international human rights instruments forming the 
legal basis for a right to a remedy and reparation). 
2. See Rwanda Killers Face Local Justice, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2005, 12:59 PM), http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/africa/4335405.stm. 
3. About the ICTY, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Dec. 8, 2012); 
About ICTR, UN ICTR, http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 8, 2012); About the Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN SCSL, http://www.sc-sl.org/ABOUT/ 
tabid/70/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 8, 2012); About the STL, STL, http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl 
(last visited Dec. 8, 2012); About ECCC, UN ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc (last visited Dec. 8, 
2012); About the Court, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/ICC/About%20the%20Court/Pages/about%20 
the%20court.aspx (last visited Dec. 8, 2012).  
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However, this globalization of criminal justice has generated debate 
regarding whether the aims of international criminal justice are always 
reconcilable with, and conducive to, the pursuit of peace. This potential tension 
between “justice” and “peace” is a paradox, given that a fundamental rationale 
for holding persons accountable for crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity is to contribute to stability and peace by deterring future 
atrocities, bringing justice to victims, and paving the way for the re-establishment 
of the rule of law and reconciliation.4 
Yet, it is widely acknowledged that such efforts can also have negative 
consequences—possibly generating instability and frustrating domestic efforts at 
peace and reconciliation by, for example, opening old wounds, creating a 
disincentive to negotiate peace, or interfering with traditional justice processes, 
which may be considered more appropriate or effective, or both, in certain 
contexts. This tension between justice and peace can be seen time and again as a 
byproduct of international efforts to address the aftermath of gross violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law, and leads to the difficult 
question of “if and when justice should take priority over peace.”5 
A.  Pinochet in the House of Lords 
Spain’s efforts to prosecute General Augusto Pinochet, the former Chilean 
Head of State, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, and the divided 
response to these efforts within Chilean society and among international leaders, 
graphically raised precisely such questions regarding the compatibility of 
international justice and domestic peace. 
In 1973, General Pinochet seized power after the democratically elected 
government of President Salvador Allende was overthrown by a military coup.6 
During General Pinochet’s seventeen-year regime, some 2,603 people are 
reported to have been executed, tortured, or “disappeared.”7 In 1978, the Chilean 
government passed an Amnesty Law, shielding from prosecution any persons 
 
4. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 28 (2001); Sara Dareshori, Pursuing Peace in an Era of International Justice, 
50 POLITORBIS 83 (2010), available at www.dplf.org/uploads/1292518783.pdf. 
5. Nick Grono, Deputy President of the Int’l Crisis Group, Speech to the Overseas Development 
Institute: Peace versus Justice? Understanding Transitional Justice in Fragile States (Oct. 9, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2009/the-role-of-international-justice-
mechanisms-in-fragile-states.aspx).  
6. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DISCREET PATH TO JUSTICE?: CHILE, THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE MILITARY 
COUP 1 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/americas/chile/chile0903.pdf; Amnesty 
Int’l, Chile: The Terrible Legacy of Augusto Pinochet, AI Index AMR 22/010/2004 (Sept. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR22/010/2004/en/cf781af9-d58e-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/ 
amr220102004en.pdf; Frances Webber, The Pinochet Case: The Struggle for the Realization of Human Rights, 
26 J. L. SOC’Y. 523, 524 (1999). 
7. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 1; Amnesty Int’l, supra note 6; Webber, supra note 6, at 
524. 
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who committed crimes between 1973 and 1978.8 It was during that five-year 
period, when Chile was ruled under a state of siege, that the vast majority of 
human rights violations are alleged to have been committed.9 In 1989, the 
Chilean people held free, democratic elections, and General Pinochet conceded 
defeat to opposition leader, Patricio Aylwin.10 General Pinochet remained a 
senator for life, however, which office provided him immunity from prosecution, 
and he retained his position as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.11 
President Alwyn’s election initiated a period of transition, in which victims of 
General Pinochet’s regime called for justice and demanded accountability.12 
However, elements of the former regime, including General Pinochet himself, 
called on Chileans to forget the past as a means of moving forward.13 Pinochet 
claimed, “It is best to remain silent and to forget. It is the only thing to do: we 
must forget. And forgetting does not occur by opening cases, putting people in 
jail.”14 
In 1991, the new government established a truth and reconciliation 
commission (“TRC”) to document the crimes committed during General 
Pinochet’s regime.15 However, the 1978 Amnesty Law prevented the TRC from 
naming or prosecuting alleged perpetrators.16 Nevertheless, in 1998, General 
Pinochet was arrested in London on the basis of an international arrest warrant 
and request for extradition issued by an examining magistrate in Spain.17 Spain 
sought to prosecute General Pinochet for his role in crimes against humanity 
committed during his rule under a Spanish law authorizing the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction.18 
 
8. The law does not distinguish between common crimes and human rights violations, and the only 
exception to amnesty is for persons “implicated in the homicide and passport falsification case in relation to the 
assassination of political activist Orlando Letelier” in Washington, D.C. Law No. 2.191, Abril 19, 1978, DIARIO 
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). See Avenues and Obstacles to Justice, MEMORIA Y JUSTICIA, http://www.memoriay 
justicia.cl/english/en_avenues.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2012); Webber, supra note 6, at 529. 
9.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 1, 4 n.2. 
10. Background on Chile, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.cja.org/article.php?list= 
type&type=196 (last visited Nov. 25, 2012);  Webber, supra note 6, at 528, 529; Alfonso Serrano, Death of a 
Dictator, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-215_162-2251475.html. 
11. Background on Chile, supra note 10; Webber, supra note 6, at 529; Serrano, supra note 10.  
12. Background on Chile, supra note 10. 
13. Id.; Amnesty Int’l., supra note 6. 
14. Background on Chile, supra note 10. 
15. Id. 
16. Id.; Amnesty Int’l., supra note 6. 
17. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: The Pinochet 
Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 311 (2001); Frederic L. Kirgis, The Pinochet 
Arrest and Possible Extradition to Spain, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Oct. 1998), http://www.asil. 
org/insigh27.cfm. 
18. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17, at 311; Kirgis, supra, note 17; see David Sugarman, The Arrest of 
Augusto Pinochet: Ten Years On, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/ 
the-arrest-of-augusto-pinochet-ten-years-on (“[U]niversal jurisdiction permits a national court to try a person 
suspected of a serious international crime even if neither the suspect nor the victim are nationals of the [forum 
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Initially, the High Court of the United Kingdom found that General Pinochet 
could not be extradited because, as a former Head of State, he was entitled to 
state immunity in relation to the alleged crimes.19 However, in an unprecedented 
decision,20 the House of Lords upheld the extradition, and found that General 
Pinochet could not claim immunity for acts of torture committed after December 
8, 1988, the date that the United Kingdom’s ratification of the Torture 
Convention took effect.21 In reaching this decision, Lord Browne-Wilkinson cited 
the ICTY Trial Judgment in the Furundžija case, which found that the 
prohibition against torture is jus cogens, i.e. a peremptory norm.22 
In Chile, news of General Pinochet’s arrest and the House of Lords’ decision 
was met with a mixed response, generating both pro-Pinochet demonstrations 
and anti-Pinochet celebrations.23 The Chilean government considered the arrest 
an interference with Chile’s judicial sovereignty and asserted that Chileans 
should decide how to deal with General Pinochet.24 It even threatened to bring a 
case against Spain before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).25 However, 
victims of the Pinochet regime celebrated the arrest as an opportunity to finally 
hold General Pinochet accountable for his crimes.26 
The response from the international community was also mixed. Former 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher criticized the U.K. government for 
sanctioning the case and claimed that General Pinochet would not get a fair trial 
if extradited to Spain.27 The U.S. Department of State further expressed concern 
that the arrest could upset Chile’s fragile democracy.28 However, the U.N. High 
 
state], and the crime took place outside that [forum].”). 
19. Andrea Bianchi, Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 237, 239-
40 (1999). 
20. Regina v. Bartle and the Comm’r of Police for the Metropolis and Others, [1999] 2 All E.R. 97 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
21. Bianchi, supra note 19, at 239-40. 
22. He stated that even though none of the alleged conduct was committed by or against U.K. citizens, 
the Torture Convention requires that torture is triable in the U.K. regardless of where it is committed. He further 
stated that “International law provides that offences jus cogens may be punished by any state because the 
offenders are ‘common enemies of all mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension and 
prosecution.’” See Regina, [1999] 2 All E.R. 97 (H.L.) [8-9]. 
23.  Chilean President Calls for Calm, BBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 1998, 9:04 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/americas/222238.stm; Joy and Anger at Pinochet Ruling, BBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 1998, 6:56 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/221936.stm. 
24.  Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17, at 315; Chilean President Calls for Calm, supra note 23; Joy and 
Anger at Pinochet Ruling, supra note 23. 
25. Pinochet Dispute for World Court, BBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 1999, 9:50 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/americas/448607.stm. 
26. Chilean President Calls for Calm, supra note 23. 
27. More specifically, Thatcher added that this was likely, “not least because the key witnesses for his 
defence run the risk of immediate arrest if they set foot on Spanish soil.”  See Thatcher Pleads Pinochet’s Case, 
BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 1999, 8:52 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/467114.stm. 
28. E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr., Pursuing Pinochet:  The Case We Made 22 Years Ago, TRANSNATIONAL 
INST. (Dec. 6, 1998), http://www.tni.org/article/pursuing-pinochet-case-we-made-22-years-ago. 
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Commissioner for Human Rights hailed the ruling as “a ringing endorsement that 
torture is an international crime subject to universal jurisdiction.”29 Amnesty 
International also supported General Pinochet’s extradition, stating that “[i]n the 
absence of a state putting on trial one of its own people for crimes against 
humanity, the obligations of the international community come into play.”30 
Ultimately, however, in March 2000, General Pinochet was allowed to return 
to Chile after British authorities found that he was unfit to stand trial due to ill 
health.31 Yet, the endeavor to hold General Pinochet accountable for his crimes 
did not end there. Spain’s intervention had the unexpected consequence of 
“opening the floodgates” to national prosecutions.32 When Pinochet returned to 
Chile, the Supreme Court of Chile removed his immunity from prosecution under 
Chilean law, and thereafter, over 177 complaints were brought against him for 
alleged human rights violations committed during his rule.33 However, these 
proceedings were also suspended on medical grounds, and to the dismay of 
many, General Pinochet died in 2006 without having been tried or convicted for 
any crime.34 Nevertheless, the indefinite suspension of General Pinochet’s case 
did not prevent significant progress, since the time of his arrest, in holding other 
persons to account for crimes committed during his regime.35 
General Pinochet ultimately evaded international criminal justice. However, 
international intervention at a time when Chilean courts were either unable or 
unwilling to act served as a catalyst for national prosecutions. Whether 
international efforts to hold General Pinochet accountable brought justice to the 
people of Chile, and in particular, the victims of his crimes and their loved ones, 
is thus open to question. 
B. The ICC Case Against Joseph Kony et al. and Prospects for Peace in 
Northern Uganda 
The situation in Northern Uganda provides another illustration of the 
potential clash between international criminal justice efforts and the quest for 
 
29. Straw Considers Pinochet Case, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 1999, 4:22 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/302487.stm. 
30. Judges Re-run Pinochet Hearing, BBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 1999, 12:02 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/257228.stm. 
31. Frederic L. Kirgis, Pinochet Arrest in Chile, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Dec. 2000), 
http://www.asil.org/insigh58.cfm; Pinochet ‘Unfit to Face Trial’, BBC News (Jan. 12, 2000, 12:04 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/599526.stm. 
32. Background on Chile, supra note 10; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 5. 
33. Kirgis, supra note 31; Pinochet Charged with Kidnapping, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2000, 7:11 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1050374.stm. 
34. See, e.g, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 5; Chile Drops Pinochet Trial, BBC NEWS (July 
1, 2002, 8:21 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2080500.stm; Chile’s Gen Pinochet Dies at 91, BBC 
NEWS (Dec. 11, 2006, 12:53 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6167237.stm. 
35. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6. 
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peace. Northern Uganda’s twenty-year conflict between rebel leader Joseph 
Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”) and the Ugandan government involved 
a campaign of terror waged against the civilian population.36 Thousands of people 
were killed, and some two million uprooted.37 The LRA, notorious for its 
brutality, is alleged to have committed mass rape, murder, and mutilation of 
civilians, and to have abducted tens of thousands of children to serve as 
combatants and sex slaves.38 It is alleged that the Ugandan Army, rather than 
protecting this vulnerable population, committed its own widespread abuses, 
including forced displacement, killing, torture, rape, and arbitrary arrests and 
detention.39 
The United Nations has described these events in Northern Uganda as “one 
of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.”40 The scale of human suffering 
resulting from the conflict created an equally pressing urgency to resolve it.41 As 
a means of encouraging LRA fighters to surrender, the Ugandan government 
enacted an Amnesty Act in 2000, which guaranteed that LRA fighters who put 
down their weapons would be immune from prosecution.42 In 2003, unable to 
apprehend LRA leaders, the government referred “The Situation Concerning the 
Lord’s Resistance Army” to the Prosecutor of the ICC.43 In response, the 
Prosecutor opened an investigation into the matter, and in 2005, issued five arrest 
warrants against senior LRA leaders, including Kony.44 
The ICC’s indictments generated considerable concern within Northern 
Ugandan society that the threat of ICC prosecution could derail the fragile peace 
process and prolong the violence.45 Rather than resorting to retributive justice, 
those who opposed ICC involvement generally preferred seeking to resolve the 
 
36. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UPROOTED AND FORGOTTEN: IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
IN NORTHERN UGANDA (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/09/19/uprooted-and-forgotten. 
37. See id. 
38. See generally id.;  Michael Otim & Marieke Wierda, Uganda: Impact of the Rome Statute and the 
International Criminal Court, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1-2 (May 2010), http://www.ictj.org/ 
sites/default/files/ICTJ-Uganda-Impact-ICC-2010-English.pdf; Amnesty Int’l, Left to Their Own Devices: The 
Continued Suffering of Victims of the Conflict in Northern Uganda and the Need for Reparations, 5, AI Index 
AFR 59/009/2008 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR59/009/ 
2008/en/55689934-af47-11dd-a845-0749a6f015c0/afr590092008en.pdf. 
39. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 1-2; 
Amnesty Int’l, supra note 38.  
40. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36, at 13. 
41. Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 2. 
42. See CONCILIATION RES., COMING HOME: UNDERSTANDING WHY COMMANDERS OF THE LORD’S 
RESISTANCE ARMY CHOOSE TO RETURN TO A CIVILIAN LIFE (2006), available at http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-
r.org/files/ComingHome_200605_ENG.pdf; see also Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 2. 
43. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/ 
press%20releases/2004/president%20of%20uganda%20refers%20situation%20concerning%20the%20lord_s%
20resistance%20army%20_lra_%20to%20the%20icc?lan=en-GB; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 2. 
44. Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 2. 
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36, at 3. 
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conflict through restorative means including dialogue, amnesties for LRA 
members, and the reintegration of former combatants.46  
In June 2006, less than a year after the indictment of Kony and his 
colleagues, the LRA entered into peace talks with the Ugandan government.47 
Over the next two years, numerous agreements were signed between the warring 
parties, including a cessation of hostilities agreement in August 2006, which, 
although breached on numerous occasions, led to a reduction in violence.48 
As a price for his purported cooperation, Kony repeatedly demanded that the 
ICC withdraw the arrest warrants.49 Aware that the arrest warrants threatened to 
derail discussions that could lead to peace, but with no legal avenue available to 
it to compel withdrawal of the warrants,50 the Ugandan government entered into 
an agreement with the LRA in February 2008 to establish a War Crimes Division 
in the High Court of Uganda, so that alleged perpetrators could be tried 
nationally.51 The agreement also provided for the pursuit of justice through 
traditional mechanisms.52 With the establishment of this War Crimes Division, 
Uganda could potentially challenge the admissibility of the ICC case against 
Kony under Article 19 of the Rome Statute.53 The Ugandan government further 
promised the rebels that once the final peace agreement was signed, it would seek 
a deferral of the ICC prosecution from the UN Security Council under Article 16 
 
46. Id.; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 2. 
47. Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 3. 
48. See generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., NORTHERN UGANDA:  THE ROAD TO PEACE, WITH OR WITHOUT 
KONY 11 (2008), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/ 
Northern%20Uganda%20The%20Road%20to%20Peace%20with%20or%20without%20Kony.pdf; see also 
INT’L CRISIS GRP., PEACE IN NORTHERN UGANDA? 1-5 (2006), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/ 
africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/B041%20Peace%20in%20Northern%20Uganda.pdf. 
49. INT’L CRISIS GRP., PEACE IN NORTHERN UGANDA?, supra note 48, at 15. 
50. As party to the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, the Ugandan government is obliged to cooperate 
with the ICC, including by arresting and surrendering any wanted persons in the Ugandan State.  See id. 
51. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda-Lord’s Resistance Army, Annex, art. 7, 
Feb. 19, 2008, available at http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/uploads/images/u_h8S9SwfKutKGw70eM4vw/ 
agendaitem3296.pdf; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 3; Manisuli Ssenyonjo, How Joseph Kony is Keeping 
His Options Open, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2008, 1:17 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine/2008/mar/ 
26/lra.background. 
52. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, supra note 51, at art. 19; Otim & Wierda, supra 
note 38, at 3; Ssenyonjo, supra note 51.  
53. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 19, July 17, 1988, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. Article 19, 
entitled “Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case,” provides, in relevant part: 
1. The Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The 
Court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with 
article 17. 
2. Challenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in article 17 or 
challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by:   
 . . .  
 (b)    A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or      
         prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted . . . . 
Id.; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 4. 
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of the Rome Statute.54 If granted, such deferral would provide the Ugandan 
government a year, with the possibility of renewal, within which to bring the five 
wanted LRA leaders to justice domestically.55 
Ultimately, it appears that these assurances were not enough. In late 2008, 
the peace process degenerated when Kony refused to sign the final peace deal.56 
In the meantime, in July 2008, the Ugandan government went ahead with its 
plans to establish the War Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda.57 The 
War Crimes Division of that Court recently finished its first trial of an LRA 
commander, concluding that the accused was entitled to amnesty for any crimes 
committed during the conflict.58 Furthermore, in 2010, the Ugandan government 
passed the International Criminal Court Act, incorporating the Rome Statute into 
Ugandan law.59 
 
54. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 53, at art. 16.  Article 16, entitled 
“Deferral of investigation or prosecution,” provides:  
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a 
period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be 
renewed by the Council under the same conditions. 
Id. 
55. INT’L CRISIS GRP., NORTHERN UGANDA, supra note 48, at 9; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 5. In 
February 2008, the ICC Pre-trial Chamber requested the Ugandan government to provide information regarding 
the status of the arrest warrants, noting the agreement to establish the War Crimes Division. The government 
responded that that establishment would take place after the final peace agreement with the LRA, that the War 
Crimes Division “is not meant to supplant the work of the International Criminal Court and accordingly, those 
individuals who were indicted by the International Criminal Court will have to be brought before the [War 
Crimes Division] for trial.”  See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, 
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Report by the Registrar on the Execution of the Request for Information from the 
Republic of Uganda on the Status of Execution of the Warrants of Arrest, 3 (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc461285.pdf. 
56. Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 5; INT’L CRISIS GRP., THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY:  END 
GAME? 1 (2011), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/182%20 
The%20Lords%20Resistance%20Army%20-%20End%20Game.pdf. 
57. Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 3. In October 2008, the ICC Pre-trial Chamber initiated 
proceedings under Article 19(1) of the Rome Statute to determine whether it could still investigate and 
prosecute the case against Kony et al.  In March 2009, it determined that the case is still admissible, finding:   
the scenario against which the admissibility of the Case has to be determined remains therefore 
the same as at the time of the issuance of the Warrants, that is one of total inaction on the part 
of the relevant national authorities; accordingly, there is no reason for the Chamber to review 
the positive determination of the admissibility of the Case made at that stage.  
In December 2009, the Appeals Chamber affirmed. See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot 
Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05 OA 3, Judgment on the appeal of the Defence against 
the “Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute” of 10 March 2009, ¶¶ 7, 12, 92 
(Sep. 16, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc743635.pdf. 
58. Uganda’s Amnesty for LRA Commander a ‘Setback’ for Justice, AMNESTY INT’L (Sept. 23, 2011) 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/uganda%E2%80%99s-amnesty-lra-commander-
%E2%80%98setback%E2%80%99-justice-2011-09-23. 
59. However, this Act “is prospective from June 25, 2010, and thus cannot be applied to the period of 
conflict in [N]orthern Uganda.”  OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., PUTTING COMPLEMENTARITY INTO PRACTICE: 
DOMESTIC JUSTICE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN DRC, UGANDA, AND KENYA 7 (2011), available at 
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While Northern Uganda has experienced relative calm since the initial 
ceasefire in 2006, the LRA has reemerged, terrorizing communities in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic.60 
In response, in October 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama authorized the 
deployment of some 100 U.S. Special Forces troops to advise the Ugandan 
government on removing Kony and other senior LRA leaders from the 
battlefield.61 
In the context of the conflict in Northern Uganda, one can only wonder 
whether Kony would have signed a peace agreement, thereby ending the LRA’s 
reign of terror in the region, if the ICC arrest warrants had been rescinded. Yet, 
one could also argue that Kony was only willing to participate in peace talks at 
all because the ICC had taken action. Furthermore, it is significant that, similar to 
the Chilean context, the threat of international prosecution motivated the 
Ugandan government to set up its own system for trying war crimes suspects. 
Whether this is indeed a positive development will depend on the quality of 
justice meted out by that court, which remains to be seen. At the same time, it is 
clear that the ICC indictment of LRA leaders has not prevented continued 
violence in the region. Additionally, with some of the highest-level alleged 
perpetrators still evading both international and local accountability, justice to 
victims in Northern Uganda has yet to be realized. 
Ultimately, it is difficult to conclude in this case whether the pursuit of 
international criminal justice assisted in the facilitation of, or acted as an obstacle 
to, peace. Paradoxically, the only reasonable conclusion may very well be that it 
did both. 
C.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Peace in 
the Balkans 
The work of the ICTY arguably presents a more clear-cut case in which it 
may be concluded that international criminal justice, to some extent, has 
facilitated the pursuit of peace. The Security Council established the ICTY in 
1993 as a means of addressing the protracted conflict in the region of the former 
Yugoslavia while the war in the Balkans was still raging.  It was considered that 
prosecuting perpetrators of war-time atrocities, when national courts were 
unwilling or unable to do so, would contribute to the cessation of hostilities, the 
maintenance of peace, and to reconciliation in the region.62 
 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/putting-complementarity-into-practice-20110120.pdf.  
60. INT’L CRISIS GRP., NORTHERN UGANDA, supra note 48, at 20; INT’L CRISIS GRP., THE LORD’S 
RESISTANCE ARMY, supra note 56, at 1-2. 
61. INT’L CRISIS GRP., THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY, supra note 56, at 1-2. 
62. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N.Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
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The Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(“Bosnia”), were signed in December 1995.63 Slobodan Milošević, then President 
of Serbia and Montenegro, was a key party to the peace process, along with 
Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović.64 By 
this time, Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadžić had already been 
indicted by the ICTY for his alleged role in atrocities committed during the war.65 
It was not until May 1999 that the ICTY indicted Milošević for alleged war 
crimes in Kosovo.66 Significantly, this marked the first time a sitting Head of 
State had been indicted for war crimes.67 Milošević was indicted amidst the North 
American Treaty Organization air strikes against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, which commenced after international efforts to resolve the Kosovo 
conflict through peace talks at Rambouillet had failed.68 
As an ad hoc, temporary institution, the ICTY was never meant to substitute 
for the adjudication of war crimes cases at the national level. Accordingly, ten 
years after the ICTY’s establishment, in Resolution 1503 (2003), the Security 
Council endorsed a strategy devised by the ICTY’s Judges for the completion of 
its work.69 Pursuant to this Completion Strategy, the ICTY concentrated on the 
prosecution of the highest-level accused and transferred the cases of lower and 
mid-level accused to courts in the region, which were considered at that point, to 
varying degrees, willing and ready to receive them.70 Furthermore, in Resolution 
1503, the Security Council called upon the international community to assist 
national jurisdictions, as part of the Completion Strategy, in improving their 
capacity to prosecute cases transferred from the ICTY.71 In this manner, capacity 
building of courts in the former Yugoslavia handling war crimes cases was 
integrated into the ICTY’s mandate. 
 
63. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., 
Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75, available at http://www.ohr.int/dwnld/?content_id=379. 
64. Seven Questions:  Richard Holbrooke on Radovan Karadzic, FOREIGN POLICY (July 24, 2008), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/07/23/seven_questions_richard_holbrooke_on_radovan_karadzic; 
Jim Hooper, Trying War Criminals—Dayton’s Mandate for Apprehending War Criminals, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/trial/hooper.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
65. Karadžić was indicted by the Tribunal in July 1995.  See Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. 
IT-95-5-I, Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 25, 1995), http://www.icty.org/x/ 
cases/karadzic/ind/en/kar-ii950724e.pdf. 
66. Following his transfer to the ICTY, in 2001, Milošević was also indicted for crimes in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  See Leila Sadya Nadat, The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW 
(Oct. 2002), http://www.asil.org/insigh90.cfm. 
67. Milosevic Indictment Makes History, CNN (May 27, 1999), http://articles.cnn.com/1999-05-
27/world/9905_27_kosovo.milosevic.04_1_milosevic-indictment-nikola-sainovic-milosevic-and-
four?_s=PM:WORLD. 
68. See The Conflicts, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/322 (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
69. S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). 
70. Completion Strategy, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); see S.C. 
Res. 1503, supra note 69. 
71. See S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 69. 
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In line with its Completion Strategy, the ICTY indicted a total of 161 high-
level perpetrators, and will not be indicting any more.72 The ICTY also 
transferred eight cases of lower-level accused to courts in Bosnia, Croatia and 
Serbia.73 However, thousands of crimes committed during the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia remain to be investigated and/or tried.74 To facilitate this effort, the 
ICTY, often working in tandem with international partners,75 has gone to great 
lengths over the years to assist national legal institutions and professionals in 
building their capacity to deal with these crimes, including through supporting 
the establishment of specialized war crimes chambers in Bosnia, Croatia and 
Serbia.76 
The degree to which the ICTY, through its efforts, has been successful in 
fulfilling its mandate of contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace 
in the region, and in particular, to reconciliation, has generated much debate. 
However, it is difficult to dispute that as in the Ugandan and Chilean cases, the 
efforts of the international community to hold accountable perpetrators of 
atrocities committed during the wars in the Balkans served as a catalyst for the 
domestic prosecution of alleged war criminals. Courts in Bosnia, Serbia and 
Croatia have taken up the mantle and have made significant progress in 
adjudicating their own cases in accordance with international human rights 
standards.77 Although these jurisdictions still face serious challenges, for 
example, in dealing with substantial case backlogs, providing witness protection 
 
72. Development of the Local Judiciaries, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/10462 (last visited Nov. 
19, 2012); see Key Figures, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last updated Oct. 
16, 2012). 
73. Additionally, the Tribunal’s Office of the Prosecutor transferred files from cases that were 
investigated, but did not result in the issuance of indictments for follow-up by local prosecutors’ offices as 
appropriate.  See Transfer of Cases, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/TransferofCases (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2012). 
74. Int’l Justice Desk, Thousands Still to be Tried in Balkans for War Crimes, RADIO NETHERLANDS 
WORLDWIDE (May 14, 2012, 2:18 PM), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/thousands-still-be-tried-
balkans-war-crimes. 
75. For example, with financial support from the European Union, the Tribunal entered into a 
partnership with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (“OSCE”) Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (“ODIHR”), the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research 
Institute, and OSCE Field Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, to implement the “War 
Crimes Justice Project” aimed at supporting the capacity of legal professionals in the region of the former 
Yugoslavia dealing with war crimes cases. War Crimes Justice Project, OSCE OFF. FOR DEMOCRATIC INST. & 
HUM. RTS., http://www.osce.org/odihr/74803 (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); see Capacity Building, UN ICTY, 
http://www.icty.org/ sections/Outreach/CapacityBuilding (last visited Nov. 19, 2012). 
76. See Development of the Local Judiciaries, supra note 72. 
77. See, e.g., OSCE, DELIVERING JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:  AN OVERVIEW OF WAR 
CRIMES PROCESSING FROM 2005 TO 2010 7 (2011), available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_ 
doc_2011051909500706eng.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: SERBIA’S WAR CRIMES 
CHAMBER 2 (2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/eca/serbia0607/serbia0607web.pdf; 
INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., CROATIA:  SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 5, 14-
21 (2006), available at http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Croatia-Developments-2006-
English_0.pdf. 
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and support, and securing evidence,78 it can be concluded that rather than 
derailing peace efforts, through stimulating and supporting domestic war crimes 
prosecutions, efforts on the international plane have contributed to strengthening 
the rule of law, and in this respect, to peace-building in the Balkans. 
D.  Conclusion 
A lesson that can be drawn from these case studies is that transitional justice 
cannot be considered and addressed through a single approach. The pursuit of 
justice is context-specific, and different mechanisms are appropriate in different 
situations. The establishment of an international criminal tribunal to try alleged 
war criminals may have had a positive impact in the former Yugoslavia, due to 
the socio-political and cultural factors specific to the circumstances of that 
conflict, as well as the timing of the pursuit of justice. However, the success of 
tribunals such as the ICTY does not necessarily suggest that an international 
criminal tribunal is the most appropriate approach in every context, nor that 
prosecuting alleged perpetrators alone can adequately address all of the problems 
faced by societies in transition. Ultimately, it is important that whatever method 
or combination of methods is pursued, due regard is paid to the necessary balance 
between peace and justice.  
The complexities that can arise when attempting to reconcile peace and 
justice are well portrayed in an op-ed by Ian Paisley that recently appeared in the 
New York Times.79 He discusses the fact that the ICC just rendered its first guilty 
verdict in the case of Thomas Lubanga for coercing children to be soldiers in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.80 He starts, “An African proverb states, ‘Peace is 
costly but it is worth the expense.’”81 Here, the expense, perhaps, is justice. He 
points out that “[t]he Court to date has spent around $1 billion,” and that 
although justice “has been done . . . there is no peace in that country.”82 And there 
is not. Finally, he concludes that: 
Proponents of the [ICC] say there cannot be peace without justice. Yet 
experience teaches us that this is not always the case. Reconciliation is 
not an easy option, but it does allow people to move forward with the 
hope of unity, and the potential for justice in the future. The experiences 
of Northern Ireland and South Africa show us that there is nothing more 
 
78. See generally OSCE, supra note 77; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 77; INT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUST., supra note 77. 
79. Mr. Paisley is the son of Rev. Ian Paisley, former leader of the Democratic Unionist Party in 
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important than peace. If this means the International Criminal Court does 
not always intervene or deliver justice, it may be a price that is worth 
paying.83 
III. HOT TOPIC 2: THE PERILS OF THE FRAGMENTATION  
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In addition to the unprecedented development in the past two decades of 
international and hybrid criminal courts, there has also been an enormous growth 
in a variety of other types of international tribunals.84 The proliferation of these 
institutions has led to the phenomenon of disparate courts interpreting and 
applying the same legal principles and instruments, sometimes in 
complementary, but often in competing ways. The absence of an international 
mechanism to resolve inconsistent interpretations has raised concerns regarding 
the perils of the fragmentation of international law. 
A. ICJ and ICTY Treatment of the Legal Standard for Attribution of State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts—“Effective Control,” 
“Overall Control,” or It Depends? 
Recently, the ICJ and the ICTY have been at odds regarding the issue of 
what degree of control over paramilitaries is required to attribute their acts to a 
foreign State, therefore rendering them internationally wrongful. The issue first 
arose in 1984 in the ICJ’s Nicaragua case, which concerned the activities of the 
contras, a Nicaraguan rebel group that was operating in Nicaragua against the 
Sandinista regime.85 In that case, the Court considered whether alleged violations 
of international humanitarian law committed by the contras were imputable to 




84. For example, since the 1990s, there has been a tremendous increase in bilateral and multilateral 
investment promotion and protection treaties, which provide for mandatory arbitration of disputes before an 
arbitral tribunal.  This has generated a proliferation of treaty-based investment dispute arbitral tribunals. See, 
e.g., Charles N. Brower, The Evolution of the International Judiciary: Denationalization through Jurisdictional 
Fragmentation, in THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 103RD ANNUAL 
MEETING 170, 182 (2009). 
85. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
14, ¶ 392 (June 27). 
86. Id. ¶¶ 20, 113. The Court also considered whether the acts of “persons of the nationality of 
unidentified Latin American countries,” known as “UCLAs,” such as blowing up underwater oil pipelines and 
an attack on an oil and storage facility, were imputable to the United States.  With regard to the UCLA’s, the 
Court found in the affirmative, reasoning that “[a]lthough it is not proved that any United States military 
personnel took a direct part in the operations, agents of the United States participated in the planning, direction, 
support and execution of the operations.”  See id. ¶¶ 81, 85-86. 
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In addressing this question, the Court first considered that it was necessary to 
determine: 
whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States 
Government was so much one of dependence on the one side and control 
on the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal 
purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on 
behalf of that Government.87 
The Court found that “there is no clear evidence of the United States having 
actually exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to justify treating the 
contras as acting on its behalf.”88 Specifically, it reasoned, inter alia, that 
although the evidence before it indicated that the assistance provided by the 
United States to the contras was crucial to the contras’ activities, the evidence 
did not establish that the contras were completely dependent on the United 
States.89 However, the Court further found that this conclusion did not “suffice to 
resolve the entire question of the responsibility incurred by the United States 
through its assistance to the contras.”90 
According to the Court, in order for the acts to be imputable to the United 
States, it was sufficient to prove that the United States “had effective control of 
the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged 
violations were committed.”91 To establish effective control, the Court required a 
showing “that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts 
contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by” Nicaragua.92 The 
Court concluded that although the United States provided various crucial forms 
of assistance to the contras, including financial and logistical support, the 
evidence did not demonstrate that the United States directed or enforced the 
alleged acts.93 
In the case of Prosecutor v. Tadić, the ICTY also addressed the legal 
standard for imputing the acts of individuals to a foreign State, specifically, the 
acts of the Bosnian Serb Army to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”).94 
In this case, however, the purpose of the inquiry was not to determine 
international responsibility for the Bosnian Serb forces’ acts, but rather to 
determine whether the Bosnian Serb Army acted as a de facto state organ, 
 
87. See id. ¶ 109. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. ¶ 110. 
90. See id. 
91. See id. ¶ 115 (emphasis added). 
92. See id. 
93. See id. ¶ 116. 
94. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 584 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf. 
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thereby rendering the conflict in Bosnia international.95 In answering this 
question, the ICTY revisited the test for attribution of state responsibility set 
forth by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case (“Nicaragua test”).  
In interpreting and applying the Nicaragua test, the majority of the Trial 
Chamber considered that it was “neither necessary nor sufficient merely to show 
that the [Bosnian Serb Army] was dependent, even completely dependent, on the 
[FRY Army] and the [FRY] for the necessities of war. It must also be shown that 
the [FRY Army] and the [FRY] exercised the potential for control inherent in 
that relationship of dependency or that the [Bosnian Serb Army] had otherwise 
placed itself under the control of the [FRY].”96 
Presiding Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, however, disagreed with the 
majority’s interpretation of the Nicaragua test.97 She considered that Nicaragua 
established two distinct tests for attribution. Specifically, she stated that “the 
effective control standard was never intended to describe the degree of proof 
necessary for a determination of agency founded on dependency and control” and 
that “the majority erroneously imports the requirement of effective control to an 
agency determination.”98 
Judge McDonald observed that the effective control requirement was not 
mentioned until after the ICJ determined that there was no agency relationship 
between the contras and the United States. On this basis, she concluded that “the 
showing of effective control is a separate and distinct basis for determining State 
responsibility for the conduct of others.”99 She further found that “the appropriate 
test of agency from Nicaragua is one of ‘dependency.’”100 In sum, while the 
majority found that the Nicaragua test did not necessarily require a showing of 
dependence on the State, but did require a high degree of control by the State—
namely, effective control—Judge McDonald found that with a showing of 
dependency, a further showing of effective control was not required. 
On appeal, the ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the Nicaragua test 
altogether.101 It determined instead that the requisite degree of control required 
under international law can vary in the circumstances of each case.102 It 
distinguished between two scenarios. First, it considered that for the actions of 
individuals or groups not organized into military structures, it is necessary to 
show that “specific instructions concerning the commission of that particular act 
 
95. Id. ¶ 585; Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 104 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-
aj990715e.pdf. 
96. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 588. 
97. Id. at 288, 292 (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 294 (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
99. Id. at 295 (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
100. Id. at 288, 299 (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
101. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 115. 
102. Id.  ¶ 117. 
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had been issued by that State to the individual or group in question” or that “the 
unlawful act had been publicly endorsed or approved ex post facto by the State at 
issue.”103 However, when the acts of “armed forces or militias or paramilitary 
units” were at issue, the Court required a less stringent showing that a state 
wields “overall control” over the group, including through financing, training, 
and equipping the group, as well as coordinating or assisting in the planning of 
the military actions of the group.104 Demonstration that the state issued 
instructions for the commission of the specific act in question was not required.105 
The ICJ recently revisited this issue in the “Bosnian Genocide” case,106 and 
relied on its test set forth in Nicaragua.107 In doing so, the ICJ explained that it 
was “unable to subscribe” to the ICTY’s contrary interpretation of the issue.108 
The Court reasoned that the ICTY’s jurisdiction is limited to determining the 
criminal responsibility of individuals and does not extend to questions of state 
responsibility.109 It noted that it attached a high degree of importance to the 
ICTY’s legal and factual findings in relation to issues of criminal liability that 
fall within its jurisdiction, but surmised that the same was not true for issues of 
general international law that do not fall within the ICTY’s specific purview.110 
The ICJ also clarified the Nicaragua test. Referring to the Nicaragua Court’s 
finding that “the evidence available to the Court . . . is insufficient to demonstrate 
[the contras’] complete dependence on United States aid,”111 it noted that: 
according to the Court’s jurisprudence, persons, groups of persons or 
entities may, for purposes of international responsibility, be equated with 
State organs even if that status does not follow from internal law, 
provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in “complete 
dependence” on the State, of which they are ultimately merely the 
 
103. Id.  ¶ 137. 
104. Id. ¶¶ 131, 137. 
105. Id.   
106. Specifically, the Court considered whether the Srebrenica massacres “were committed by persons 
who, though not having the status of organs of [Serbia and Montenegro], nevertheless acted on its instructions 
or under its direction or control.” Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 
2007 I.C.J. 43 ¶ 396 (Feb. 26).  
107. Specifically, the Court stated that: 
[g]enocide will be considered as attributable to a State if and to the extent that the physical acts 
constitutive of genocide that have been committed by organs or persons other than the State’s 
own agents were carried out, wholly or in part, on the instructions or directions of the State, or 
under its effective control.  
Id. ¶ 401. 
108. Id. ¶ 403. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. ¶ 391 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 110 (June 27)). 
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instrument. In such a case, it is appropriate to look beyond legal status 
alone, in order to grasp the reality of the relationship between the person 
taking action, and the State to which he is so closely attached as to 
appear to be nothing more than its agent . . . .112 
Having answered this question in the negative in terms of the Bosnian Serb 
Army’s relationship to the FRY, the Court then explained that even absent a 
relationship of “complete dependence,” state responsibility could still arise if, as 
established in the Nicaragua case, it was proven that the state had “directed or 
enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian 
law alleged by the applicant State.”113 It further explained that for such conduct to 
give rise to state responsibility, it would “have to be proved that that State had 
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which 
the alleged violations were committed”.114 Thus, the Court in the Bosnian 
Genocide case clarified that, as Judge McDonald argued in her Tadić dissent, the 
Nicaragua case established two distinct tests for the attribution of state 
responsibility. 
It appears that the ICJ attempted to explain and, perhaps, justify the 
inconsistent interpretations of the ICJ and ICTY as resulting from differences in 
jurisdiction.115 In doing so, the ICJ dodged the conclusion that its own 
jurisprudence conflicted with that of a fellow international tribunal. Time will 
only tell whether in the future, as international questions are increasingly brought 
to the fore, such implicit cooperation will continue or whether areas of 
divergence will grow. 
B. Inconsistency in Decisions by Investment Dispute Tribunals—Disparate 
Interpretations of the MFN Clause in the Germany-Argentina Bilateral 
Investment Treaty 
Fragmentation also has arisen in the realm of international investment 
disputes, with the growth of institutions devoted to the resolution of such 
disputes. For example, Judge Brower has been involved in a series of 
international investment arbitrations concerning disputes arising from the 
 
112. Id. ¶ 392. 
113. Id. ¶ 399 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 
115). 
114. Id. (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115). 
115. In this regard, the Court posited that “[i]nsofar as the ‘overall control’ test is employed to determine 
whether or not an armed conflict is international, which was the sole question which the Appeals Chamber was 
called upon to decide, it may well be that the test is applicable and suitable.”  However, the Court was not 
persuaded that the “overall control” test was equally applicable under the law of State responsibility for the 
purpose of determining “when a State is responsible for acts committed by paramilitary units, armed forces 
which are not among its official organs.” Id. ¶ 404. 
[1] BROWER.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013  4:00 PM 
2013 / The Hottest Topics in International Dispute Resolution 
20 
Germany-Argentina bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”)116 in which different 
arbitral tribunals have interpreted identical Germany-Argentina BIT provisions in 
inconsistent ways. At least four German companies, Siemens,117 Hochtief,118 
Wintershall,119 and Daimler,120 have brought cases against Argentina under the 
BIT. The issue in each case has been whether the claimants were required under 
Article 10 of the BIT to spend eighteen months seeking the resolution of their 
investment disputes in Argentine courts as a prerequisite to invoking 
international arbitration, or whether, relying upon the BIT’s Most-Favoured-
Nation (“MFN”) provisions, they were entitled first to submit the dispute to 
international arbitration.  
Pursuant to Article 10(1) of the BIT, if a dispute arises between a German 
investor in Argentina, or vice versa, the parties should seek to settle the dispute.121 
However, Article 10(2) further provides that: 
If a dispute within the meaning of paragraph 1 cannot be settled within 
six months from the date on which one of the parties concerned gave 
notice of the dispute, it shall, at the request of either party, be submitted 
to the competent courts of the Contracting Party in whose territory the 
investment was made.122 
Article 10(3) further provides that: 
The dispute may be submitted to an international arbitral tribunal in any 
of the following circumstances: (a) At the request of one of the parties to 
the dispute where, after a period of 18 months has elapsed from the 
moment when the judicial process provided for by paragraph 2 of this 
article was initiated, no final decision has been given or where a decision 
 
116. Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Argentine Republic on the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Ger.-Arg., Oct. 8, 1993, 1910 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter Germany-Argentina BIT]. 
117. Siemens v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 3, 2004), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC508_
En&caseId=C7. 
118. Hochtief v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction (Oct. 24, 2011), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2351
_En&caseId=C260. 
119. Wintershall v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award (Dec. 8, 2008), https://icsid.worldbank. 
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1492_En&caseId=C39. 
120. Daimler v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1082.pdf. 
121. Germany-Argentina BIT, supra note 116, art. 10(1). 
122. Id. at art. 10(2). 
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has been made but the parties are still in dispute; (b) Where both parties 
to the dispute have so agreed.123 
Pursuant to the MFN provisions, no contracting party shall provide in its 
territory to the investments of nationals or companies of the other contracting 
party less favorable treatment than that provided to its own companies or 
nationals or those of third-party states.124 
In two of the cases, Siemens and Hochtief, the tribunals ruled that the MFN 
provisions in the BIT permitted the Claimants to arbitrate.125 However, in the 
Wintershall and Daimler cases, the tribunal ruled to the contrary, finding that the 
Claimants could not rely on the MFN provisions in order to avoid first submitting 
their disputes to Argentine courts for eighteen months.126 
 
123. Id. at art. 10(3). 
124. The following BIT provisions refer to MFN treatment and were considered by the tribunals, to 
varying degrees:   
Article 3(1), which provides:   
Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments in its territory by or with the 
participation of nationals or companies of the other Contracting party to treatment less 
favourable than it accords to investments of its own nationals or companies or to 
investments of nationals or companies of any third State.  
Article 3(2), which provides:   
Neither Contracting Party shall subject nationals or companies of the other Contracting 
Party, as regards their activity in connection with investments in its territory, to treatment 
less favourable than it accords to its own nationals or companies or to nationals or 
companies of any third State. 
Article 4, which provides, in relevant part:   
(1)  Investments by nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall enjoy full 
protection as well as juridical security in the territory of the other Contracting Party.  
 . . . 
(3)  Nationals or companies of either Contracting Party whose investments suffer losses 
in the territory of the other Contracting Party owing to war or other armed conflict, 
revolution, a state of national emergency or insurrection shall be accorded by the 
latter Contracting Party treatment which is no less favourable than that accorded to 
its own nationals or companies, as regards restitution, compensation, indemnification 
or other valuable consideration. Such payments shall be freely transferable.  
(4)  Nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall enjoy most-favoured-nation 
treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party in respect of the matters 
provided for in this article.  
Article 7(1), which provides:   
If the legislation of either Contracting Party or obligations under international law 
existing at present or established hereinafter between the Contracting parties in addition 
to this Treaty contain a regulation, whether general or specific, entitling investments by 
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to a treatment more favourable than 
is provided for by this Treaty, such regulation shall, to the extent that it is more 
favourable, take precedence over this Treaty. 
See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶¶ 82, 88; Hochtief, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, ¶ 15; Wintershall, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, ¶¶ 10-11, 160-97. 
125. Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶ 184; Hochtief, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, ¶¶ 75, 124-25. 
126. Wintershall, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, ¶ 197; Daimler, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, ¶ 281. 
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More specifically, in the Siemens case, Siemens invoked the Germany-
Argentina BIT’s MFN provisions to support its contention that it was entitled to 
submit its dispute directly to international arbitration, as permitted under the BIT 
between Argentina and Chile.127 Argentina claimed that the scope of the MFN 
provisions in the Germany-Argentina BIT did not include the BIT’s dispute 
settlement system.128 In 2004, the Tribunal unanimously ruled in favor of 
Siemens, finding that the MFN provisions permitted the claimants to arbitrate.129 
The Tribunal in the Hochtief case considered the same issue, whether 
Hochtief could rely on the MFN provisions in the Germany-Argentina BIT to 
seek direct access to international arbitration, without prior referral to the 
domestic court of Argentina.130 Like Siemens, Hochtief claimed that the MFN 
provisions “entitle[d] it to rely upon the more liberal provisions on dispute 
settlement in the Argentina-Chile BIT.”131 Argentina argued that the MFN 
provisions “applie[d] only to substantive protections under the BIT, which do not 
include the clauses on dispute resolution in Article 10.”132 Last year, the Tribunal, 
by majority, ruled that the MFN provisions applied to dispute settlement under 
Article 10 of the BIT and that the arbitration could proceed.133 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Tribunal noted that it: 
is conscious of the advantages of consistency in the approaches of 
different tribunals to similar questions. It is also aware of the significance 
that other tribunals have attached to differences between the formulations 
of MFN provisions in various treaties. That said, it is the responsibility of 
this Tribunal to interpret to the best of its ability the specific provisions 
of the particular treaties that are applicable in this case, and not to choose 
between broad doctrines or schools of thought, or to conduct a head-
count of arbitral awards taking various positions and to fall in behind the 
numerical majority.134 
In the Wintershall and Daimler cases, however, the tribunals reasoned, in 
part, that recourse to arbitration is conditioned strictly upon compliance with the 
provision of Article 10 of the Germany-Argentina BIT requiring that a dispute 
first be submitted to Argentine courts for eighteen months, and furthermore, that 
 
127. Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶ 32. 
128. Id. ¶¶ 35-40.  
129. Id. ¶ 184. 
130. Hochtief, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, ¶¶ 15-19. 
131. Id. ¶ 56. 
132. Id. ¶ 20. 
133. Id. ¶¶ 75, 124-25. 
134. Id. ¶ 58.  
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Article 10 can only be circumvented when it is clear from the text of the MFN 
provisions that it was the intent of the contracting parties to permit this option.135 
These cases underscore one of the greatest fears arising from the proliferation 
of international courts and tribunals—the potential that disparate decisions might 
lead to unfair or prejudicial outcomes. Unlike in the ICJ and ICTY cases 
discussed previously, the contradictory outcomes of these Germany-Argentina 
BIT arbitrations cannot be defended on the grounds of differences in 
jurisdiction—nor can they be justified on factual grounds. Ultimately, the 
different rulings can be explained purely by the fact that different panels of 
arbitrators construed the same law differently. Reasonable minds can and will 
differ on the same set of facts and when confronted with the same laws—this is 
an indisputable and unavoidable feature of our domestic and international justice 
systems. However, such uncertainty is magnified in the international arena when 
one accounts for the multitude of international tribunals, which exercise separate 
mandates and are not legally accountable to one another, but can be governed by 
overlapping bodies of law, and the lack of an international appellate body to 
resolve inconsistencies. While this may indeed be unavoidable, this feature of 
international law raises concerns for its participants, who often rely on 
consistency and predictability in making decisions to participate in the first 
instance. It remains to be seen whether a mechanism can be devised and accepted 
by states that would better ensure consistency of rulings. 
IV. HOT TOPIC 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC COURTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
Contemporary structural and substantive developments in the arena of 
international law have also led to a growing interface, or what some would 
characterize as a “clash,” between the jurisprudence of international institutions 
and domestic courts. In an increasingly interdependent world, domestic courts are 
now frequently called upon to interpret and apply the decisions of international 
legal institutions, and international legal institutions are required to apply and 
analyze the legality of national decisions. The question remains whether these 
institutions, both international and domestic, can coexist harmoniously and 
ensure that justice is served. 
A.  Avco Corp. v. Iran Aircraft Industries 
Avco Corp. v. Iran Aircraft Industries, a case in which Judge Brower was 
involved as a Member of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, exemplifies this 
 
135. Wintershall, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, ¶¶ 114-57, 167-72; Daimler, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, 
¶¶ 200, 281. 
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trend.136 The dispute, first submitted to the Tribunal in 1982, concerned Avco’s 
performance and Iran Aircraft Industries’ payment under certain contracts. Avco 
relied on voluminous invoices to prove its claim.137 At a pre-hearing conference 
before the Tribunal’s three-judge Chamber to which the case was assigned, Avco 
requested guidance regarding whether the invoices should be submitted into 
evidence or whether the Tribunal would prefer to receive independently audited 
and authenticated accounts receivable ledgers listing the invoices.138 The 
Chamber informed Avco that such ledgers would suffice.139 However, in its 1988 
decision, the Tribunal ultimately found 2-1 that it “[could] not grant Avco’s 
claim solely on the basis of an affidavit and a list of invoices, even if the 
existence of the invoices was certified by an independent audit,”140 and Iran 
Aircraft Industries received a significant net award on its counterclaim.141 Judge 
Brower issued an Opinion in which he strongly dissented to this outcome on the 
basis that “the Tribunal . . . misled [Avco], however unwittingly, regarding the 
evidence it was required to submit, thereby depriving [Avco], to that extent, of 
the ability to present its case . . . .”142 
When Iran sought to enforce its award in a U.S. District Court under the New 
York Convention,143 which provides for the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards, the Court granted Avco’s motion for summary judgment, refusing 
enforcement.144 The Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Avco indeed had 
been “unable to present its case” in contravention of Article V(1)(b) of the New 
York Convention.145 In reaching this decision, the Second Circuit not only 
evaluated the validity of the Tribunal’s award under the New York Convention, 
but also interpreted Article IV(1) of the Tribunal’s constitutive document, the 
Algiers Accords,146 which provides that the Tribunal’s awards are “final and 
binding.”147 
 
136. Avco Corp. v. Iran Aircraft Indus., 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 200 (1988). 
137. See Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1992). 
138. See id. 
139. See id. at 143-44. 
140. Id. at 144. 
141. Id. at 142. 
142. Id. at 144. 
143. See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
144. Iran Aircraft Indus., 980 F.2d at 142. 
145. See id. at 146. 
146. The Algiers Accords are comprised of two Declarations, including: the Declaration of the 
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, U.S.-Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M 224, 
reprinted in 1 C.T.R. 3; and the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the 
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, U.S.-Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M 230, reprinted in 1 C.T.R. 9 [hereinafter Claims Settlement 
Declaration]. 
147. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 146, at art. IV(1); see Iran Aircraft Indus., 980 F.2d at 
144-45 (The Second Circuit looked to the Tribunal’s interpretation of the provision and determined that the 
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The Second Circuit’s decision, however, did not resolve the dispute. Rather, 
Iran brought the matter back before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, filing 
a claim against the United States for failing to enforce the award against Avco.148 
In 1998, the Tribunal ruled in favor of Iran, finding that the United States had 
breached its obligation to ensure that the Tribunal’s awards are final and binding, 
valid, and enforceable in the United States, and ordered the U.S. government to 
pay the award.149 
In summary, while the U.S. District Court was given the task of interpreting 
the powers of an international tribunal, that same tribunal was asked to decide 
upon the legitimacy of the decision of a domestic court. These cases exemplify 
the discrepancies and contradictions that can arise when today’s transnational 
disputes force domestic and international courts reciprocally to recognize and 
interpret the legitimacy of their decisions and their governing laws. 
B.  The ICJ and United States Death Penalty Cases 
The next set of cases provides another stark illustration of the complexities 
that can arise when domestic courts are required to apply the jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals. To date, three countries—Paraguay,150 
Germany,151 and Mexico152—have initiated proceedings against the United States 
before the ICJ for breach of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, a multilateral treaty to which the United States is a party.153 Article 36 
requires authorities of states parties to inform arrested foreign nationals of their 
right to contact their consular authorities “without delay.”154 
 
United States had no obligation to directly enforce the award, but only to provide a mechanism for enforcement 
that is at least as favorable as that provided to parties seeking enforcement of other foreign arbitral awards. The 
Second Circuit also dismissed Iran’s argument that the “final and binding” language of the Algiers Accords 
requires that the award be treated as res judicata, and held that this language only means that the issues resolved 
in the arbitration cannot be tried in court de novo.). 
148. See Iran v. United States, Award No. 586-A27-FT (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. June 5, 1998), reprinted in 
34 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 39 (1998); see also CHRISTOPHER S. GIBSON  & CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE 
IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AT 25: THE CASES EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW FOR INVESTOR-STATE & 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 167 n.5 (2007). 
149. GIBSON & DRAHOZAL, supra note 148, at 167 n.5. 
150. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 266 (Apr. 9). 
151. LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27). 
152. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
153. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The ICJ has jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the interpretation and 
application of the Convention, pursuant to the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of 
Disputes, to which the United States was also a party. In March 2005, however, the United States withdrew 
from the Convention’s Optional Protocol. See Frederic L. Kirgis, President Bush’s Determination Regarding 
Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention Rights, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Mar. 2005), 
http://www.asil.org/insights050309a.cfm. 
154. Vienna Convention, supra note 153, at art. 36. 
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Each case involved foreign nationals who had been sentenced to death by 
U.S. courts. In what is perhaps the most well-known of these cases, the “Avena 
Case,” Mexico claimed that U.S. authorities arrested, tried and sentenced to death 
fifty-four of its nationals without advising them of their right to consular 
assistance.155 In 2004, the ICJ issued its judgment on the merits in the case, 
finding that the United States had violated Article 36(1) of the Vienna 
Convention by failing to inform the fifty-four Mexican nationals of their 
Convention rights (“Avena Judgement”).156 As a remedy, the Court required the 
United States to provide the individuals with review and reconsideration of their 
convictions.157 
In response to the Avena Judgement, President George W. Bush issued a 
memorandum to the U.S. Attorney General stating that “the United States will 
discharge its international obligations under [the Avena Judgement] by . . . 
having State courts give effect to the decision.”158 In 2008, however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court considered the President’s memorandum and the Avena 
Judgement in the case of Medellín v. Texas, which involved one of the Mexican 
nationals covered by the Avena Judgement.159 The Supreme Court held that 
“neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable 
federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of successive habeas 
petitions.”160 The Court reasoned that although the United States is bound by the 
ICJ’s decisions, the treaties could not be given effect as federal law absent 
implementing legislation because the treaties at issue in the Avena case were not 
self-executing.161 
Just five months after the Supreme Court’s decision, on August 5, 2008, and 
despite provisional measures ordered by the ICJ to stay his death sentence, 
Medellín was executed.162 The Medellín decision and its aftermath raise important 
 
155. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Application Instituting Proceedings, ¶ 1 (Jan. 9, 2003), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/1913.pdf. 
156. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Judgment, ¶ 153(4) (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf.  With respect to three of the individuals who faced imminent execution, the 
ICJ first issued a provisional measures order, calling upon the United States to “take all measures necessary to 
ensure that [the individuals] are not executed pending final judgment in these proceedings.”  Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals, Order of Provisional Measures, ¶ 59 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/128/8180.pdf. 
157. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Judgment, ¶ 153(9) (Mar. 2004) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf. 
158. Margaret E. McGuiness, Medellín v. Texas:  Supreme Court Holds ICJ Decisions under the 
Consular Convention Not Binding Federal Law, Rejects Presidential Enforcement of ICJ Judgments over State 
Proceedings, 12 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 6 (2008). 
159. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 1348. 
162. Texas Executes Mexican Murderer, BBC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2008, 9:17 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/7542794.stm. In June 2008, Mexico filed a request for interpretation of the Avena Judgment, as well as for 
provisional measures.  On July 16, 2008, the ICJ issued an order requiring the United States to “take all 
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questions regarding both the willingness and the ability of the United States to 
comply with its international obligations, and highlight the ramifications of non-
compliance. The decision generated considerable concern, among other things, 
that other countries would similarly breach their obligations under the Vienna 
Convention, putting Americans at risk abroad.163 
Yet, despite the negative ramifications that arose from Medellín, positive 
indicators can be found. First, it is noteworthy that the Executive Branch did 
attempt to compel state courts to comply with a decision of the ICJ. Furthermore, 
prior to Medellín’s execution, the “Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008” 
was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives, a bill that, if passed, would 
have empowered U.S. federal courts to hear the claim of a foreign national whose 
right to consular notification was violated.164 These steps taken by the Executive 
and Legislative branches in response to international demands suggest a 
willingness on the part of the United States to honor international legal 
commitments. One hopes that further lessons can be learned from the Medellín 
case, and that the political will has grown for the United States to ensure its 
compliance with the international rule of law. 
C.  The Chevron-Ecuador Lago Agrio Dispute 
The storied dispute between Chevron and the government of Ecuador, which 
has played out in numerous fora, both domestic and international, is perhaps the 
most apt illustration of the growing interface, and often clash, between the 
jurisprudence of international and domestic courts. 
The dispute arose from the activities of an oil exploration and production 
concession operated by the Texaco Petroleum Company (“TexPet”), later 
acquired by Chevron, in the Ecuadorian Amazon, as part of a consortium.165 
TexPet’s partners in this endeavor included the government of Ecuador and its 
state-owned oil company.166 In 1992, TexPet relinquished its interest in the 
 
measures necessary to ensure” that Medellín would not be executed pending judgment on the request for 
interpretation.  See Request for the Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Order of Provisional Measures, ¶ 80 (July 16, 2008), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14639.pdf. 
163. Sarah H. Lee, Strangers in a Strange Land: The Threat to Consular Rights of Americans Abroad 
After Medellin v. Texas, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1519, 1544 (2009). 
164. The bill was introduced into the House of Representatives by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA).  It was 
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary but was never enacted. See Avena Case Implementation Act 
of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
110hr6481ih/pdf/BILLS-110hr6481ih.pdf; H.R. 6481 (110th) Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6481 (last visited Nov. 25, 2012). 
165. TexPet was a subsidiary of Texaco. In 2001, Chevron acquired Texaco and its subsidiaries. See 
Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Final Award 9 (Aug. 31, 2011); see also 
Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 2012). 
166. Ecuador’s State-owned oil company, the Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (“CEPE”), was 
replaced by the State-owned company PetroEcuador in 1989.  See Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, 
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consortium,167 and by 1998, pursuant to a settlement agreement, was released 
from all liability for any environmental harm caused by the consortium’s 
activities after completing designated remediation projects.168 
1. TexPet’s Breach of Contract Lawsuits and Related Arbitration Under the 
United States-Ecuador BIT 
Between 1991 and 1993, TexPet filed a number of lawsuits in Ecuadorian 
courts, alleging breach of contract in relation to the consortium’s activities.169 The 
lawsuits lingered without resolution in the Ecuadorian court system for some 
fifteen years. Consequently, in 2006, Chevron, having acquired TexPet’s interest, 
sought resolution of its cases in an international forum, commencing arbitration 
proceedings against Ecuador in The Hague under the United States-Ecuador 
BIT.170 
The international arbitral tribunal was confronted, inter alia, with the 
question of whether Ecuador violated both domestic and international law as a 
result of undue delay in deciding the lawsuits.171 Ultimately, the tribunal found 
that Ecuador had breached Article II(7) of the BIT, which provides that states 
parties must “provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights 
with respect to investment,” and awarded Chevron roughly $100 million in 
damages.172 In the wake of that award Ecuador has commenced proceedings 
under the same BIT against the United States, alleging a dispute between the two 
over the correct “interpretation and application” of the very same Article of their 
BIT.173 
2. Aguinda Class Action in United States District Court 
Meanwhile in 1993, indigenous residents of the Ecuadorian Amazon 
commenced a class action lawsuit against Texaco in the U.S. District Court for 
 
¶¶ 208-209. 
167. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002). 
168. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
169. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, ¶ 217. 
170. See id. ¶ 228; see generally Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Ecuador, Aug. 27, 
1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-15 (entered into force May 11, 1997) [hereinafter U.S.-Ecuador BIT].  
171. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, ¶ 35. 
172. Id. ¶¶ 141-42; see U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 170, at art. II, ¶ 7. 
173. The Republic of Ecuador v. The United States of America, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1455 (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).  However, the tribunal in this 
case notified the parties that it would be dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, with reasons to follow.  See 
Luke Eric Peterson, United States Defeats Ecuador’s State-to-State Arbitration; Will Outcome Dissuade 
Argentine Copycat Case?, INV. ARBITRATION REPORTER (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.iareporter.com/ 
articles/20120903_3/print. 
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the Southern District of New York, seeking compensation for alleged 
environmental contamination to the rivers and rain forests of the region caused 
by TexPet’s oil operations between 1964 and 1992.174 Texaco sought dismissal of 
the case on forum non conveniens grounds, arguing that Ecuador was an adequate 
and appropriate alternative forum.175 The District Court ultimately ruled in 
Texaco’s favor,176 and the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, but not before 
securing Texaco’s consent to the jurisdiction of Ecuadorian courts.177 
3. Lago Agrio Action in Ecuadorian Court 
Having lost their battle in U.S. District Court, residents of Ecuador’s 
Amazon rainforest filed a new lawsuit against Chevron and Texaco in 2003—this 
time before a court closer to home, in Lago Agrio, Ecuador.178 After an eight-year 
legal battle, on February 14, 2011, the Ecuadorian court found that Texaco had 
“caused extensive damage to the environment, peoples, and indigenous cultures 
in Ecuador in violation of Ecuadorian law,” and awarded the Lago Agrio 
plaintiffs over $18 billion in damages (“Lago Agrio Judgment”).179 
In the meantime, while the Lago Agrio proceeding was still pending, 
Chevron took preemptive action in two fora outside of Ecuador to counter a 
potential judgment against it. 
4. Second Arbitration Under United States-Ecuador BIT and RICO Suit 
First, in 2009, Chevron initiated a second BIT arbitration against Ecuador in 
The Hague. In this proceeding, the international arbitral tribunal was asked to 
adjudge Chevron’s claim that “Ecuador’s judicial branch has conducted the Lago 
Agrio Litigation in total disregard” of domestic and international law.180 Chevron 
requested money damages and equitable relief, including an award requiring 
 
174. See Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 473. 
175. Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 598.  Note that Texaco also argued for the dismissal of the case 
on the grounds of “failure to join the Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador, which . . . were indispensable 
because (1) the requested equitable relief within Ecuador could not otherwise be ordered, and (2) 
Petroecuador’s own actions would be at issue in the case.” Id. 
176. See Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 476. 
177. See id. at 480; see also Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 235. 
178. Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 600. 
179. See id. at 620-21. The decision was affirmed by the Ecuadorian Court of Appeals, and Chevron 
subsequently sought further review before Ecuador’s National Court of Justice. See Chevron Corp. v. Texaco, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, First Interim Award on Interim Measures, 13 (Jan. 25, 2012); Press 
Release, Chevron, Chevron Appeals Illegitimate Ruling in Ecuador (Jan. 20, 2012),  http://www.chevron.com/ 
chevron/pressreleases/article/01202012_chevronappealsillegitimaterulinginecuador.news. 
180. Texaco, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 4 (Sept. 23, 
2009). 
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Ecuador to indemnify Chevron for any potential damages against it awarded by 
the Ecuadorian court.181 
Secondly, on February 1, 2011, just prior to the Lago Agrio Judgment, 
Chevron commenced proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York against, among others, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs and their 
lawyers.182 Chevron’s complaint included allegations that the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
engaged in a criminal enterprise to obtain a judgment against Chevron in the 
Ecuadorian court or a settlement through unlawful means, including fraud and 
extortion, in violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (“RICO”).183 Chevron sought, among other things, a preliminary injunction 
barring enforcement of a potential judgment in the Ecuadorian courts against 
Chevron anywhere in the world outside of Ecuador.184 
On February 8, 2011, the District Court issued a temporary restraining order 
against enforcement outside Ecuador of any adverse Ecuadorian judgment.185 The 
following day, the international arbitral tribunal, noting the District Court’s 
temporary restraining order, issued its own order directing Ecuador “to take all 
measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement or 
recognition within and without Ecuador of any judgement against [Chevron] in 
the Lago Agrio Case . . . pending further order or award in these arbitration 
proceedings . . .” (“February 9, 2011 Order”).186 
In March 2011, noting the Lago Agrio Judgment, as well as the international 
arbitral tribunal’s February 9, 2011 Order, the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York granted Chevron’s request for a preliminary injunction.187 
The Court concluded, among other things, that the Ecuadorian judicial system 
lacks impartiality and integrity and that there was “ample evidence of fraud in the 
Ecuadorian proceedings.”188 Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals for the 
 
181. Id. ¶ 76. 
182. Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 625. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 625-26; see also Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 238. The District Court severed the claim for a 
declaratory judgment from the other claims on April 15, 2011.  See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 800 F. Supp. 2d 
484 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
185. Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 626. 
186. See Texaco, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Order for Interim Measures, 11 (Feb. 9, 2011). 
Most recently, on January 25, 2012, after the Ecuadorian court of appeal dismissed Chevron’s appeal against 
the Lago Agrio Judgment, the international arbitral panel reissued the order against enforcement that it had 
granted as an interim award. See Texaco, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, First Interim Award on Interim 
Measures, 16 (Jan. 25, 2012). On February 16, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Second Interim Award on Interim 
Measures, and on February 27, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility. See Texaco, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Second Interim Award on Interim Measures 
(Feb. 16, 2012); see also Texaco, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility (Feb. 27, 2012). 
187. Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 660. 
188. Id. at 633-34, 636. 
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Second Circuit vacated the injunction,189 finding that challenges to the validity of 
a foreign judgment can occur only after enforcement of the judgment is sought.190 
The Court cited considerations of international comity, stating that “[t]he court 
presuming to issue such an injunction sets itself up as the definitive international 
arbiter of the fairness and integrity of the world’s legal systems” and that such a 
court “risks disrespecting the legal system not only of the country in which the 
judgment was issued, but also those of other countries, who are inherently 
assumed insufficiently trustworthy to recognize what is asserted to be the 
extreme incapacity of the legal system from which it emanates.”191 
5. Petition Before the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights 
To complicate matters further, on February 9, 2012, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs 
filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for 
precautionary measures under Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure.192 The 
plaintiffs claimed that the relief sought by Chevron before the arbitral tribunal 
threatened the plaintiffs’ rights under the American Convention for Human 
Rights, and in particular, the rights to life, physical integrity, health, a fair trial, 
judicial protection, and equal treatment under the law.193 They asked the 
Commission to “call for precautionary measures from [Ecuador] sufficient to 
assure that [it] will refrain from taking any action that would contravene, 
undermine, or threaten” their rights.194 Shortly thereafter, on March 2, 2012, the 
Lago Agrio plaintiffs withdrew the petition, stating that precautionary measures 
were no longer warranted in light of a judgment of the Ecuadorian court of 
appeal, which found that Ecuadorian courts could not give effect to the arbitral 
tribunal’s order.195 The court reasoned that no legal mechanism existed which 
would allow it to suspend the recognition or enforcement of the Lago Agrio 
judgment.196 Although the court “affirm[ed] Ecuador’s commitment to its 
 
189. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234, 247. 
190. Id. at 241, 247. 
191. Id. at 243-44.  Since that decision, however, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs reportedly have commenced 
proceedings to enforce their judgment in Canada and Brazil. Fred W., Ecuador Commences Actions in Canada 
and Brazil to Enforce 18 Billion Judgment Against Chevron, CATHARSIS OURS BLOG (June 30, 2012), 
http://fredw-catharsisours.blogspot.com/2012/06/ecuador-commences-actions-in-canada-and.html. 
192. Letter from Pablo Fajardo et al., Plaintiffs’ Legal Representatives, Calle Eloy Alfaro y Progreso 
Nueva Loja—Sucumbíos, and Aaron Marr Page, Counsel, Forum Nobis PLLC, to Dr. Santiago Canton, 




195. Letter from Pablo Fajardo et al., Plaintiffs’ Legal Representatives, Calle Eloy Alfaro y Progreso 
Nueva Loja—Sucumbíos, and Aaron Marr Page, Counsel, Forum Nobis PLLC, to Dr. Santiago Canton, 
Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Mar. 2, 2012), available at 
http://lettersblogatory.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/OAS-response.pdf. 
196. Id. 
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international obligations both in investment matters and in human rights 
matters,” it held that when a conflict arises between the two obligations, human 
rights obligations take precedence.197 
In summary, we have on the playing field: (i) a judgment from an 
international arbitral tribunal against Ecuador awarding Chevron $100 million; 
(ii) an award in Ecuadorian courts against Chevron awarding the Lago Agrio 
plaintiffs over $18 billion; (iii) two pending matters—one before an international 
arbitral tribunal and another before the U.S. courts—in which Chevron has 
alleged that the Lago Agrio litigation was conducted in violation of both 
domestic and international law; and (iv) a petition filed by the Lago Agrio 
plaintiffs against Ecuador before a human rights commission, which was 
subsequently withdrawn. Evidence has shown that with regard to the two pending 
proceedings, both U.S. domestic courts and the international arbitral tribunals are 
willing to recognize the acts of the other. Only time will tell whether this trend 
will continue, or whether we will be forced to deal with conflicting decisions and 
next determine how they can be resolved, if ever. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, taking into consideration the underlying tension and the explicit 
conflicts that arise between international and domestic institutions and within 
international law, it may be concluded that when international institutions and 
practitioners are working at their highest caliber, and when domestic societies 
and governments are receptive to, or at the very least, recognize the force of 
international law, justice, both domestic and international, may be achieved. As 
can be seen from the foregoing, however, such a result cannot be guaranteed in 





197. Id. The appellate court reconfirmed its ruling in a subsequent decision. See id. 
